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The swings of global trade in recent decades have been resulted from the global economic crisis 
and unfavorable condition of global situation. Deterioration of private demand -- as a result of economic 
crisis and increase of unemployment – has been the main reason of worsening global trade. This condition 
has, of course, affected economic performance of countries through trade channels. Furthermore, the 
recent trade agenda following to Trump administration has created another uncertainty to the world 
economy. This paper studies the impact of new trade agenda, which is represented by Trump’s plan on 
trade policy, to the world economy as well as to Indonesian and Japanese economy in particular. The 
analysis is based on computable general equilibrium of GTAP model version 6, with two scenarios: (i) Trump 
Trade Agenda when implementing 45 and 35 percent tariff to China and Mexico; (ii) Trade Hit List when 
imposing tariff to the 16 countries in the trade hit list. Impacts of both scenarios are examined in short 
run and long run. The results suggest that both scenarios in the short run will not create any significant 
effect to global economy as whole nor to Indonesian and Japan in particular. However, their impacts to 
the global economy, Indonesia, and Japan will be substantial in the long run. Therefore, Indonesia and 
Japan in particular should concern on providing sound economic policies to reduce the risk of new trade 
agenda to these economies in the long run. Some policy recommendation provided in this paper are: 
(i) Japan should focus on improving technological innovation to realize the implementation of society 
5.0 and industry 4.0 as scheduled; (ii) Indonesia should facilitate more investment to its economy and 
provide more government investment to induce accumulation of capital stock in the future. Furthermore, 
efficiencies and technological adoption should also be main concern of the Indonesian government to 
induce productivity of the economy and help mitigate the global risks in the long run.
Abstract
Keywords: trade, macroeconomy, Indonesia, Japan
JEL Classification Code: F17, F47, F62
1 Amalia Adininggar Widyasanti is a PhD graduate from Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Australia. She is currently 
a Director of Macroeconomic Planning and Statistic Analysis at Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS)
 Contact Address:
 Email: winny@bappenas.go.id; awidyasanti@gmail.com
 Phone: +62-813-19353077
 The author appreciates inputs, suggestion, and discussion towards this paper from Prof. Nakamura and Prof. Kawasaki (Graduate 
Research Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan) and Prof. Kuwahara (Cabinet Office, Japan) during her research visit on 1 – 8 
July, 2017 in Tokyo, Japan.
 Disclaimer: Views and opinions expressed in this paper are the author’s own and not reflected or represented the institution policy 
and decision.
The ImpAcT of New TrAde AgeNdA To 
mAcroecoNomIc performANce of INdoNesIA 
ANd JApAN IN shorT ANd LoNg Term
182 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 20, Nomor 2, Oktober 2017
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of world trade in recent decades has been quite volatile. The upswings and 
downswings of global trade growth were resulted from changes of global political and economic 
situation. For example, the global financial crisis happened in the mid 2008-2009 has destroyed 
flows of global trade, as the global demand was deteriorated. Furthermore, the election of 
Donald Trump as the President of the United States has raised a risk to the global economy, 
in particular to emerging economies which are considerably main suppliers to the US market. 
1.1. The Global Economic Crisis
The history tells us that the crisis hit the global economy in a cyclical pattern, which was about 
once in each 8-10 years. The global crisis was often followed by the decline in global trade, 
as depicted in Figure 1. The dynamics of global trade growth has been moving in the same 
direction as the global economic growth. In 1988, a decline in the global trade was due to 
the Iraq-Iran war and the fell of oil prices. The global recession came swiftly after the Black 
Monday of October 1987, resulting from a stock collapse (e.g. Dow Jones Industrial Average 
fall by 22.6%), which then created a global trade downturn in early 1990s. The continuation 
of the global recession was largely attributable to declining growth rates in Europe (excluding 
the U.K.) and Japan. The UK recession of 1991-92 was caused by high interest rates, falling 
housing prices and the end of the ‘Lawson boom’. High interest rates of the late 1980s or 
early 1990s caused a fall in house prices, leading to a negative wealth effect, because many 
homeowners ended up with negative equity and bank losses also increased.
Furthermore, the U.S. economy was slowing down and dipped into recession in 1991. The 
federal budget deficit increased) as the economy contracted and unemployment increased (by 
1.8 million workers).  The recession ended in March 1991, but the economy was experiencing 
a jobless recovery, where unemployment was stagnant.  
Figure 1. Dynamics of Global Economic Growth and
Global Trade Growth
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In 1997-1998, Asian economies were unfortunately hit by a crisis. The crisis was started 
in Thailand with the collapse of the Thai baht after the Thai government was forced to float the 
baht due to lack of foreign currency to support its currency peg to the U.S. dollar. At the time, 
Thailand had acquired a burden of foreign debt that made the country effectively bankrupt 
even before the collapse of its currency. The crisis then spread to most of Southeast Asia and 
Japan due to slumping currencies. Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand were the countries 
most affected by the crisis. 
The financial crisis of 2007–2008, also known as the global financial crisis and the 2008 
financial crisis, is considered by many economists to have been the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. It began in 2007 with a crisis in the subprime mortgage 
market in the US, and developed into a full-blown international banking crisis with the collapse 
of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. Excessive risk-taking by banks 
such as Lehman Brothers helped to magnify the financial impact globally. Massive bail-outs of 
financial institutions and other palliative monetary and fiscal policies were employed to prevent 
a possible collapse of the world financial system. It was then followed by the European debt 
crisis, a crisis in the banking system of the European countries using the euro. Europeans trust 
in government has dramatically declined since the onset of the crisis—particularly in the nations 
that have been hardest-hit. In Southern Europe, the crisis and responses to it have eroded trust 
in government. This condition hit the global demand, and the global trade was slumped. A 
remarkable feature of the recent crisis is the collapse in international trade. This collapse is global 
in nature (WTO 2009), and dramatic in magnitude. Levchenko et.al (2009) found that imports 
and exports in the US dropped relative to the level of overall economic activity if international 
trade flows are systematically biased towards sectors in which domestic absorption fell the most. 
In 2015-2016, the weak trade growth of just 1.3% was partly due to cyclical factors as 
economic activity slowed across the board, but it also reflected deeper structural changes in 
the relationship between trade and economic output. The most trade-intensive components of 
global demand were particularly weak last year as investment spending slumped in the United 
States and as China continued to rebalance its economy away from investment and toward 
consumption, dampening import demand (WTO, 2017). The WTO is forecasting that global 
trade will expand by 2.4% in 2017; however, as deep uncertainty about near-term economic 
and policy developments raise the forecast risk, this figure is placed within a range of 1.8% to 
3.6%. In 2018, the WTO is forecasting trade growth between 2.1% and 4%.
1.2. Trade Performance of Asian Countries
There are various achievement in trade performance of Asian countries. China’s trade has been 
surpassing the US trade within the recent years. Its share of exports in goods and services to the 
world achieved more than 10 percent in 2012, while the US share to the world export tended 
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to decline. A remarkable achievement of China’s trade was to increase its share of goods and 
services export from 0.6 percent in 1980 to 10 percent within just 32 years.
On the contrary, Japan’s share to the world’s goods and services exports has been 
declining. Its share in 2016 was only 4.2 percent, decreasing from about 7 percent in 1984. 
Meanwhile, the share of Indonesia to the global trade was flat, which is around 1 percent of 
the total world exports, and it seems that Vietnam will overtake Indonesia’s position in the 
global market soonest. 
Another phenomena to point out is that Indonesia’s and Japan’s export growth was 
moving in the same direction. Both countries were experiencing a negative growth of export 
during the recent global economic crisis in 2008-2009. In 2010, exports of both countries 
recovered very fast, as it was helped by global demand recovery. However, in 2016, even though 
countries’ exports were recovering, Japan seems to recover much faster than Indonesia does.
Figure 2. 
Export Value of Some Asian Countries
Figure 3.
Export Growth of Indonesia and Japan
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Indonesia and Japan has a close trade relationship. Japan is Indonesia’s main export 
destination, where 11.1 percent of Indonesian exports were directed to Japan. On the other 
hand, Japan is also Indonesia’s main import sourcing, as Japanese products share about 10 
percent of Indonesian imports. Indonesia and Japan trade are complementary each other, as 
both countries have different comparative advantage each other. 
Indonesia is the main world supplier for Palm Oil, Coal, and Jewelries. On the other hand, 
Japan is the main world supplier for Machineries, motor cars, as well as parts and accessories of 
vehicles. Japan main export markets are US, China, and Korea; while Indonesian main export 
markets are China, US, and Japan.
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Indonesia runs a trade surplus with Japan, because Indonesia supplies a lot of raw materials 
to Japan for its industrial process. The top import products of Japan supplied by Indonesia are 
petroleum gas, coal, copper, oil, and wires. On the other hand, Indonesia imports industrial 
products from Japan, such as: parts and accessories, iron products and steels, machineries, 
motor cars, and piston engines.
Table 1.
Top Export Products of Indonesia and Japan to the World Market
Top 5 Export Products to the 
world
Value of 
Exports, USD 
million (2016)
Share in World 
Exports
Ranking in the 
world export
Main Export 
Markets
Indonesia Palm Oil and its fractions 14.4 51.7% 1 China(11.6%) 
US (11.2%)
Japan (11.1%)
Singapore(7.8%)
India(7%)
Coal 12.9 17.3% 2
Petroleum gas 7.0 4.0% 9
Petroleum Oil 5.2 0.8% 24
Jewellery 4.1 4.3% 9
Japan Motor cars 91.9 13.2% 2 US(20.2%)
China(17.6%)
Korea(7.2%) 
Taipei(6.1%)
Hongkong(5.2%)
Parts and accessories 31.7 8.8% 3
Electronics 24.1 4.5% 8
Machines 17.8 30.8% 1
Ships and boats 12.2 16.4% 3
Table 2.
Bilateral Imports of Indonesia and Japan
IMPORTS
Indonesia from Japan Japan from Indonesia
Total: Share in imports: Total: Share in imports:
USD 13.0 mio 10%  USD 18.2 mio 3%
Top 5 products: Top 5 products:
•   Parts and accessories 46% ·   Petroleum gas 8%
•   Iron products and steels 53% ·   Coal 15%
•   Machineries 31% ·   Copper 17%
•   Motor cars 24% ·   Petroleum oil 2%
•   Piston engines 49% ·   Wire 10%
1.3. The New Trade Pattern and Global Agenda
In recent years, the economists have been noticing that there are some changes in global trade 
pattern. The relationship between global growth and global trade is getting weaker. WTO (2017) 
reported that weak international trade growth in the last few years largely reflects continuing 
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weakness in the global economy. The potential of trade to strengthen global growth can 
remain exist if the movement of goods and supply of services across borders remains strong. 
However, it is tended that policymakers attempt to address higher restrictions on imports. In 
this situation, trade cannot help boost growth and may even constitute a drag on the recovery.
WTO (2017) emphasized that the volume of world merchandise trade in historical time 
has tended to grow about 1.5 times faster than world output. Furthermore, in the 1990s it 
grew more than twice as fast. However, since the financial crisis, the ratio of trade growth to 
GDP growth has fallen to around 1.0; and the ratio fell down to 0.6, which is the first time 
drop below 1.0 since more than 20 years ago. The ratio is expected to partly recover in 2017, 
but it remains a cause for concern. The risks of trade to be going to unpredictable direction in 
the near future will be due to the lack of clarity about government action on monetary, fiscal 
and trade policies. 
Figure 4. Ratio of world merchandise trade
volume growth to world real GDP growth, 1981-2016
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Furthermore, Trump’s presidency and his trade agenda has added to higher uncertainties 
to the global trade. President Donald Trump has been seen as a protectionist; as he cancelled 
US trade deal in TPP. He also argued that US companies are the victims of the globalization. 
He pledged to impose tariff on Chinese imports as much as 45% and on goods imported from 
Mexico as much as 35%. Furthermore, in early April 2017, Trump announced the 16 countries 
that were put in his trade hit list. Those countries are: China, Japan, Germany, Mexico, Ireland, 
Vietnam, Italy, South Korea, Malaysia, India, Thailand, France, Switzerland and Indonesia, with 
eight out of 15 of them being in the Asia-Pacific.
Trump’s reason to put those countries into the trade hit list was because those countries 
are the top most import sources creating US trade deficit (Figure 4). The US trade deficit was 
the largest with China, followed by Japan. Those countries created a trade deficit to the US as 
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much as US$ -365.9 billion and US$ -72.0 billion in 2016 consecutively. Further to this, Indonesia 
was ranked at 16th country contributing to US trade deficit. Figure 6 depicts the share of the 
16 countries to US imports, which shows that 21.4 percent of US imports was contributed by 
China. The second and third contribution to US imports were Mexico and Canada, accounted 
for 13.2 and 12.6 percent consecutively. Furthermore, Japan’s and Indonesia’s contribution to 
US imports were only 6.0 percent and 0.9 percent. Surprisingly, Vietnam shared 1.9 percent of 
US imports and US import growth rate from Vietnam in the last five years reached 20 percent, 
the highest among the 16 countries.
Figure 5. US Trade Deficits with 16
Main Import Sources (USD Billion)
Figure 6. Share to US Imports and Average
Growth of US Imports from Each Country
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However, a different conclusion emerges from a closer reading of Donald Trump’s business 
interests, which was written in his trade agenda published in the 2016 Annual Report on the 
Trade Agreements Program by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 
Another look at American trade negotiation history, it is also a possibility that the US will use 
the large trade deficits to have a further negotiation with its trading partners to open up their 
markets. 
This paper studies the possible impact of new trade agenda into the Indonesian 
and Japanese economy that may occur through trade channels; and provides some policy 
recommendation to mitigate such global risk for Indonesian and Japanese economy. There are 
two scenarios of new trade agenda studied in this paper. Those are: (i) Trump Trade Agenda 
when implementing 45 and 35 percent tariff to China and Mexico; (ii) Trade Hit List when 
imposing tariff to the 16 countries in the trade hit list. Impacts of both scenarios are examined 
in short run and long run. 
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II. THEORY
There has been an extensive discussion in the literatures on the role of international trade in 
fostering economic growth. The nexus of trade versus growth is not a new debate. Were (2015) 
mentions in his paper that Smith (1776) explained trade as a vent for surplus production and 
a means of widening the market. Adam Smith proposed that trade affects economic growth 
through two channels. The first channel is that trade can reduce dimension of the internal 
market. The second channel is by increasing the extension of the market, improving the labour 
division and increasing productivity. He postulated that division of labour does not depend 
merely on technological feasibility, it greatly depends on the extent of the market as well and 
the size of market depends on the availability of stock and the institutional restrictions placed 
upon both domestic and international trade. Smith’s theory of international trade and growth 
was known as classical theory. 
Post classical international trade theory was proposed by Marshall (1890). He acknowledged 
that economic progress of nations is very much linked to the study of international trade. The 
expansion of the market created by trade will lead to the increase of global production and 
originated the increase of internal and external economies, which then resulted in increasing 
income for the economy. However, the topic has remained a key subject of debate in research 
and policy discourses, leading to ample theoretical and empirical literature on the link between 
trade and economic growth.
The renewed interest in the role of trade is largely underpinned by the latest wave of 
globalization that has been characterized by not just intensive trade integration and trade 
openness, but has also been associated with technological revolution. Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson theory postulated that trade openness can promote higher levels of output and 
growth by exploiting comparative advantage and promoting reallocation of resources – which 
make it more efficient. Daumal and Ozyurt (2010) argued that international trade can foster 
innovation, the dissemination of technological progress through exposure to new goods and 
imports of high-tech inputs and efficient production. 
Furthermore, WTO (2014) detailed an explanation on how trade affects long-term 
growth, which is through three channels. First channel is that trade can influence growth by 
affecting the return to capital accumulation. The second channel is that trade can affect growth 
through innovation incentives. This includes the effect of trade on market size, competition, 
and knowledge spillovers. Lastly, trade can have positive effects on economic growth through 
improving institutional framework. Countries who enter a trade agreement will not only 
reducing the tariff barriers but also commit to providing a certain institutional framework and 
trade rules. In summary, WTO (2014) emphasized that trade affects the economic growth due 
to the existence of accumulated learning-by-doing of specific sectors that leads to an overall 
productivity.
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2 The GTAP model explanation was obtained from: https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/current.asp
Figure 7.
Trade Channels to Growth
Empirically, Were (2015) analyzed the differential impact of trade on economic growth 
and investment based on cross-country data. The study resulted a positive and significant impact 
of trade on economic growth. However, it was found that the effect of trade to the economic 
growth differs at a disaggregated level, where the level of development does matter. Trade 
significantly and positively affects economic growth in developed and developing countries, 
but its impact is not significant in Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
This paper goes one step further and explores how international trade can affect output 
growth differently in the short-run and the long-run. The difference effects will happen In 
particular due to, international trade can lead to higher growth to the extent that it translates 
into greater factor accumulation or productivity increases, especially those associated with 
technology diffusion and knowledge spillovers.
III. METHODOLOGY
The paper uses GTAP model, which is essentially a computable general equilibrium model, with 
sector and country disaggregation available at GTAP version 7. The standard GTAP Model is a 
multiregion and multisector with a perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Bilateral 
trade is provided through the Armington assumption. Innovative aspects of this model include2: 
•	 The	 treatment	 of	 private	 household	 preferences	 using	 the	 non-homothetic	 constant	
difference of elasticity (CDE) functional form.
•	 The	Government	demand	follows	the	Cobb-Douglas	assumption	of	constant	budget	shares	
across sectors. Elasticity of substitution among composite products in the government’s 
utility function is to be unitary.
Trade
Channel 1:
Capital accummulation
Channel 2:
Innovation Incentives
(market size, competition, and knowledge spillovers)
Channel 3:
Institutional Framework
Growth
Source: WTO (modified by Author)
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3 RORDELTA is a binary coefficient which determines the mechanism of allocating investment funds across regions. When RORDELTA = 
1, investment funds are allocated across regions to equate the change in the expected rates of return (i.e., rore(r)). When RORDELTA 
= 0, investment funds are allocated across regions to maintain the existing composition of capital stocks.
4 Francois et.al (1996) fixes the trade balance; therefore the percentage change in each region current and expected rates of return 
do not equate across regions in the long-run.
•	 The	explicit	treatment	of	international	trade	and	transport	margins.	Bilateral	trade	is	handled	
via the Armington assumption.
•	 A	global	banking	sector	which	intermediates	between	global	savings	and	consumption.
Endowment factors are disaggregated into Land, Unskilled Labour, Skilled Labour, Capital, 
and Natural Resources. 
The short-run scenario uses the existing GTAP closures, where the capital stock is 
determined exogenously, because it is a period of time before new investment adds to the total 
availability of capital. In this regard, changes of output in capital goods sector (qo(“Capital”,r) 
is set to zero, satisfying the short run condition that capital stock (kb(r)) is not changed. 
Furthermore, the expected global rate of return is allowed to adjust to ensure the regional 
composition of global investment remain unchanged. In this condition, parameter of RORDELTA3 
is set to zero. 
The long-run scenario in this paper is treated by using the methodology somewhat 
between longrun closures of Francois et.al (1996) and of Walmsley (1998). The characteristics 
of long-run scenario is depicted by endogenizing capital stock. In this context, the output of 
capital goods sector (qo(“Capital”,r)) is endogenous; thus the investment levels relative to 
endowment stock (EXPAND(“Capital”,r) is exogenous and set to zero (Francois et.al, 1996), 
with the following relationship: 
EXPAND(i,r) = qcgds(r) - qo(i,r)
When EXPAND(“Capital”,r) is zero, then output of capital goods will equate the change 
of investment level (qcgds(r), and therefore capital stock (kb(r)) will also be changed. 
However, the setting of long run closure in this paper is also referring to Walmsley (1998), 
where the trade balance (DTBAL(r)) is endogenous to ensure the transmission of trade policy in 
the long-run to the adjustment of regional current account balance4. Endogenizing the trade 
balance will result in the condition where the accumulation effect of capital reflects the changes 
in capital stocks necessary to equate rate of return accrose the time. Therefore:
rorc(r) = rore(r)
Aside from this, RORDELTA is set to 1, representing the situation where global saving 
across investment is allocated in such away the expected rates of return will equate across 
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regions (composition of global net investment is changed, but the expected global rate of 
return does not change). 
rore(r) = rorg 
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
The simulation is divided into two groups. First is the scenario when Trump implements import 
tariff to China and Mexico, as he promised during his election campaign. At this stage, China 
and Mexico do not undertake any trade retaliation. Second is the scenario when Trump only 
implement import tariff to countries in the hit list. These countries get 15 percent tariff to all 
products they export to US market. Both scenarios are examined within short-run and long-
run. The short-run scenario uses the standard GTAP closure, where the long-run scenarios use 
the methodology as explained in the previous section above. The framework of simulation 
scenarios is depicted in Figure 8.
Figure 8.
Simulation Scenarios
Time-Frame Effects
US Trade Policy Scenarios
Overview
Standard
GTAP
Francois and
Walmsley
Method
Standard
GTAP
Francois and
Walmsley
Method
Simulation
Trump Trade
Agenda
Tariff to the
Trade hit list
Short-Run Long-Run Short-Run Long-Run
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4.1. Trump Trade Agenda 
(45 percent import tariff for China and 35 percent import tariff for Mexico)
The simulation results show that the implementation of Trump’s trade agenda, in which 45 
percent import tariff applied to Chinese products and 35 percent import tariff applied to Mexican 
products, will not significantly effect global economy nor Indonesian and Japanese economy in 
the short run. Countries that will be worse-off in the short run from the trade agenda is USA, 
China and Mexico. Among the three economies, Mexico will get suffer most from this agenda. 
Closures of the short run and long run scenarios 
Short-Run Closures Long-Run Closures 
exogenous Exogenous
          pop           pop
          psaveslack pcgdswld           psaveslack pcgdswld
          profitslack incomeslack endwslack           profitslack incomeslack endwslack
          cgdslack tradslack           tradslack
          ams atm atf ats atd           ams atm atf ats atd
          aosec aoreg avasec avareg           aosec aoreg avasec avareg
          afcom afsec afreg afecom afesec afereg           afcom afsec afreg afecom 
          aoall afall afeall           afesec afereg
          au dppriv dpgov dpsave           aoall afall afeall
          to tp tm tms tx txs           au dppriv dpgov dpsave
          qo(ENDW_COMM,REG) ;           to tp tm tms tx txs
Rest Endogenous ;           qo("Land",REG) 
          qo("UnskLab",REG) qo("SkLab",REG)    
          qo("NatRes",REG)
          EXPAND
          cgdslack(REG) ;
 Rest Endogenous ;
Note: Note:
•      In the short-run capital is exogenous, as investment is 
endogenous. Trade balance is endogenous
•      In the short-run capital is endogenous, as investment is 
exogenous. Trade balance is endogenous
qo("capital",REG)     : exogenous qo("capital",REG)   : endogenous 
Expand(i,REG)        : endogenous Expand(i,REG)        : exogenous 
Cgdslack                 : exogenous Cgdslack                 : exogenous
Dtbalr(REG)            : endogenous Dtbalr(REG)      : endogenous 
psaveslack              : exogenous psaveslack             : exogenous 
REAL_RET(r)          : endogenous REAL_RET(r)          : endogenous
•      RORDELTA = 0 •      RORDELTA = 1
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The reason is that Mexico relies much on the US market for its exports. Around 81 percent 
of its exports are directed to US. It shows that high dependency of Mexico on the US market has 
made it very vulnerable to any shock from the US economy, particularly when there is a trade 
shock. On the other hand, the impact of Trump Agenda is less to China than to Mexico, because 
it is only 18.4 percent of Chinese exports directed to US. This is in line with the empirical findings 
of Shivarov (2014) that countries with higher export diversification – either diversification in 
main trading partners or products --will have a better economic resilience. Furthermore, UNDP 
(2011) also emphasized that economic openness can explain the situation in which an economy 
may be vulnerable to external economic shocks (as decreasing in exports results in losses in 
export revenues and growth slowdowns). However, the scale of impact depends largely on the 
degree of concentration of a country’s export portfolio; higher degrees of export concentration 
are strongly correlated with greater volatility in export earnings and economic growth rates. 
Table 3. 
Effects of Trump Trade Agenda to Some Economies
Short Run Long Run
Change in GDP (%)
1 Indonesia 0.0 0.3
2 EU_25 0.0 0.1
3 Japan 0.0 0.1
4 USA -0.4 -0.7
5 China -0.5 -2.7
6 Mexico -0.8 -12.1
7 RestofASEAN 0.1 0.7
8 RestofASIA 0.0 0.2
9 RestofWorld 0.0 0.3
TOTAL WORLD 0.0 -0.2
Change in Welfare (EV)
Total Welfare (World) -54000.3 -133807.1
Source: Author’s simulation
Table 4.
Market Concentration Index
Country Market Concentration Index (2015)
China 0.07
Mexico 0.55
Indonesia 0.06
Japan 0.09
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To Japan and Indonesia, even though US is one of their main export destination, but it 
is only 11.2 percent of Indonesian export directed to the US and 20.2 percent of Japan export 
directed to the US.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the agenda will not be good to the global 
economy in the long run, as the world GDP will be declining and the total welfare loss of the 
global economy will be higher. The global supply of capital goods for net investment will be 
declining, and this will be the main reason that affects long-term growth of global economy. 
The volume of world trade will also be worsening in the long run, creating a shrinking of market 
size, and the end will result in a lower growth in the long run. 
Table 5.
Effect of Trump Agenda to the Global Economy
Description Short Run Long Run
-  Global supply of capital goods for NET investment -0.6 -1.0
-  Volume of world trade  -1.1 -1.3
-  Global net rate of return on capital stock -0.6 0.0
-  Value of world trade -1.2 -1.4
-  Demand in the omitted market--global demand for savings  -0.6 -1.0
-  Supply in omitted market--global supply of capital goods -0.6 -1.0
Trump’s trade agenda will definitely hurt the economy of China, Mexico, and USA in the 
long-run. Again, Mexico will suffer most from the trade agenda in the long run. It can be seen 
that the effect is worsened in the long run, as the decrease of capital accumulation in these 
three countries will dampen the economies to maintain the long-run growth. This result is in 
line with the findings from Kawasaki (2017), showing that Mexico, China, and US will suffer 
by this trade agenda. Kawasaki (2017) also emphasizes that US chemical and auto industries 
will largely decrease when China retaliates; and US textile, auto, and chemical industries will 
significantly decrease when Mexico retaliates. 
Innovation through the market size is decreasing in the long-run due to reduction of 
Chinese and Mexican markets in the US. Given that US market was mainly shared by Chinese 
and Mexican products, reduction of US imports from these two countries will hamper the term 
of trade of these countries. Furthermore, the US restriction on Chinese imports will reduce the 
US exports both in short and long run, as some of the industrial outputs will be redirected to 
domestic markets. In this regard, the US market size in the global market will be shrinking, even 
though its term of trade is still increasing. The reduction of market size will result in decreasing 
of innovation incentives, and will further reduce the economic growth in the long-run. However, 
the trump agenda can reduce US trade deficit in the long run, but not in the short run.
195The Impact of New Trade Agenda to Macroeconomic Performance 
of Indonesia and Japan in Short and Long Term
However, Trump’s trade agenda does not seem to create a negative effect to the 
Indonesian and Japanese economy, particularly in the long run; if both countries are able to 
utilize the market opportunities in particular in the US Market. There are possibilities of trade 
diversion and trade creation effects for Indonesia and Japan. In the short run, Indonesia and 
Japan can get a trade diversion effect, as import restriction applied to China and Mexico can 
provide market opportunities in the US because US domestic industries are not yet ready to 
fulfill all its domestic demand. Furthermore, since the US market opportunities are big enough, 
then Indonesia and Japan may have some room to get trade creation effects. This will result in 
an increase of Indonesian and Japanese trade surplus in the short run (Table 6).
In the long run, the US industries can adjust to the situation and able to adapt to the 
domestic market opportunities, leaving the smaller trade surplus to Indonesia and Japan. In the 
long run, US can have a smaller trade deficit by reducing the amount of imports for its domestic 
demand. For Indonesia and Japan, the market opportunities created from trade diversion and 
trade creation effects can generate a capital accumulation in the long run. Indonesian and Japan 
trade competitiveness -- depicted by terms of trade -- will also increase, providing a better room 
for these countries to export more and providing an opportunities to innovate more. These 
capital accumulation and increase of market opportunities would be the reasons of the long 
run effects to Japan and Indonesia. 
Table 6.
Change in Trade Balance of Some Countries in Short Run and Long Run
Country Short Run Long Run
 Indonesia 298.2 49.0
 Japan 3676.3 438.0
 USA -2605.5 2626.8
 China -16538.4 -5435.5
 Mexico -4286.5 586.8
Table 7.
Percentage Change of Capital Stock in Each Country in the Long Run
Countries
Capital Stocks Terms of Trade
Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run
1 Indonesia 0 0.6 0.4 0.3
3 Japan 0 0.3 0.7 0.8
4 USA 0 -1.1 1.8 1.7
5 China 0 -4.8 -3.3 -3.1
6 Mexico 0 -20.3 -13.7 -12.7
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4.2. Trade Hit List
(15 percent import tariff for countries in the trade hit list)
Simulation of Trade Hit List scenario is undertaken by imposing 15 percent tariff of US imports 
from the 16 countries in the Trade Hit List. The simulation is conducted to assess the short run 
and long run effects, in particular to Indonesia and Japan. 
The simulation results show that the implementation of 15 percent tariff to the trade hit 
list countries –including Japan and Indonesia –will not give any significant effect to the global 
GDP in the short run. However, the change of equivalent variant – which is a welfare indicator 
– is negative, meaning that there are still a welfare loss even though the global GDP does not 
change much in the short run.
The trade hit list agenda will disadvantage the global economy and all countries in the 
trade hit list for the long run. The long run GDP will decrease. Furthermore, the global welfare 
loss in the long run is higher than that of the short run. Another interesting result is that global 
trade will be shrinking and global net investment will also decrease in both short run and long 
run. It is important to highlight that all global macro indicators are worsened in the long run. 
A decrease of net investment in the short run may cause the decrease income. Furthermore, it 
will result in a decreased demand of savings, which means reducing the capability to increase 
the capital stock in the long run. When the capital stock is declining, the long run growth will 
also reduce. 
Table 8.
Effects of Trade Hit List Agenda to the Global Economy in Short Run and Long Run
Description Short Run Long Run
-  Change in World GDP  0.0 -0.5
-  Global supply of capital goods for NET investment -0.9 -1.4
-  Volume of world trade  -2.2 -2.7
-  Global net rate of return on capital stock  -0.4 0.4
-  Value of world trade  -2.8 -3.4
-  Demand in the omitted market--global demand for savings  -0.9 -1.4
-  Supply in omitted market--global supply of capital goods  -0.9 -1.4
-  Equivalent variation for the world (change) -26537.1 -171044.7
The negative impact of the trade hit list agenda will be experienced by Indonesia and 
Japan in the long run, as well as most of economies in the trade hit list. However, Indonesia 
will get a worse effect than Japan will. 
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Table 9.
The Impact of Trade Hit List Agenda to Change in GDP of Some Countries
Country
Short Run Long Run
GDP Investment GDP Capital Stock
1 Indonesia 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -1.2
2 Germany 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -1.1
3 Japan 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9
4 USA -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -2.0
5 China -0.1 -0.7 -0.9 -1.8
6 Mexico -0.3 -0.4 -5.5 -9.5
7 Ireland -0.3 -0.6 -2.4 -3.8
8 Vietnam 0.2 -0.6 0.2 0.0
9 Italy 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 -1.2
10 Korea 0.0 -0.6 -1.1 -2.2
11 India -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -1.6
12 Malaysia 0.0 -0.2 -1.6 -3.6
13 Thailand -0.1 0.0 -1.8 -2.6
14 Canada -0.1 -0.5 -2.7 -6.8
15 France 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.8
16 Taipei 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -3.0
17 Switzerland 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -1.3
18 RestofWorld 0.0 -0.5 0.1 0.2
Total World 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -1.2
When Indonesia and Japan get trade restriction from the US, its export to US will decline. 
This will be transmitted to the Indonesian and Japan economy through trade channel, affecting 
private demand to go down. When private demand goes down, it will affect imports to decline 
and the industrial outputs will also be affected. 
To Indonesia, the implementation of trade hit list agenda will impact only some 
sectors in the short run, such as: Processed Food, Light and Heavy Manufacturing, Utilliy and 
Transportation. However, all sectors will hurt from this agenda in the long run. The output of 
capital goods industry will also decline, both in the short run and long run. 
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To Japan, the implementation of trade hit list agenda will impact only some sectors in both 
short run and long run. Those sectors are: Processed Food, Light and Heavy Manufacturing, as 
well as services. The output of capital goods industry will also decline, both in the short run and 
long run, but the decline is smaller than that of Indonesia. The smaller decline of capital goods 
output in Japan than in Indonesia has resulted smaller decline of capital stock. This condition 
has made the impact of trade hit list to Japan economy is smaller than that of Indonesia in the 
long run.
However, the simulation results show that Vietnam will not be worse-off from this trade 
agenda, both in the short run and in the long run. The explanation is that the power of trade 
diversion effects from the Trade List agenda, due to Vietnam’s export comparative advantage 
in electrical, textiles/apparels, and footwear sectors.
Table 10.
Economic Performance of Indonesia by Sectors After the Implementation of Trade Hit List Agenda
Private Demand Exports Import Industrial Output
Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run
1 GrainsCrops -0.1 -0.3 -2.3 -1.2 -1.5 -2.6 0 -0.1
2 MeatLstk -0.1 -0.5 3.5 4.2 -4 -5 0.3 -0.1
3 Extraction -0.2 -0.6 2.3 1.3 -2.5 -3.1 0.6 -0.1
4 ProcFood -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -1.5 -2.1 -0.1 -0.4
5 TextWapp -0.1 -0.6 4.7 3.7 2.2 1.5 2.7 1.9
6 LightMnfc -0.1 -0.7 -0.9 -1.8 -0.8 -1.4 -0.4 -1.1
7 HeavyMnfc -0.2 -0.7 -2.7 -3.1 -0.9 -1.6 -1 -1.5
8 Util_Cons -0.1 -0.6 2.2 1.6 -2 -2.5 -0.4 -1
9 TransComm -0.1 -0.7 -0.8 -1.4 -1.3 -1.8 -0.1 -0.7
10 OthServices -0.1 -0.8 -2.2 -3.7 -1.9 -2.1 0 -0.7
11 Capital Goods -0.5 -1.2
Table 10.
Economic Performance of Japan by Sectors After the Implementation of Trade Hit List Agenda
Private Demand Exports Import Industrial Output
Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run
1 GrainsCrops 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.8 -2.2 -2.2 0.6 0.4
2 MeatLstk -0.5 -0.7 4.6 2.9 -2.6 -2.5 0.9 0.5
3 Extraction -1.1 -1.0 -2.0 -5.0 -0.3 -0.7 1.1 0.6
4 ProcFood -0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.2 -2.3 -2.5 0.0 -0.3
5 TextWapp -0.3 -0.6 2.6 2.5 -0.8 -1.2 0.7 0.5
6 LightMnfc -0.4 -0.7 -2.7 -3.1 -4.2 -4.7 -0.4 -0.8
7 HeavyMnfc -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -1.1 -3.5 -4.0 0.4 -0.2
8 Util_Cons -0.2 -0.4 5.1 5.0 -3.8 -4.4 -0.2 -0.7
9 TransComm -0.2 -0.4 0.6 0.2 -2.8 -3.2 0.0 -0.3
10 OthServices -0.1 -0.5 -3.4 -4.0 -4.3 -4.6 0.0 -0.4
11 Capital Goods -0.4 -0.9
 Source: GTAP Simulation
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As the new trade agenda will cause some downside risks to the Indonesian and Japanese 
economies, the governments would better to take some policy actions in order to mitigate 
the long-term risks5 to the economies. This paper offers some policy options and simulate the 
long-run effects of implementation of each policy option. 
To Indonesia, some policy options could be: (i) increasing investment to Indonesia through 
a better investment climate. In the model, this policy option is represented by providing a 
decrease of risk premia6 in Indonesia, as it can represent the investor valuation on how the 
improvement in investment climate undertaken by the government of Indonesia can influence 
their investment decision; (ii) Improving the investment climate and improving productivity of 
unskilled labour. For this policy option, the simulation is undertaken by providing two shocks, 
i.e. a reduced risk premia and an increase productivity (technological change) in primary input 
of unskilled labour7.
V. CONCLUSION 
The new trade agenda – represented by Trade Trump Agenda and Trade Hit List Agenda -- will 
create disadvantages to global economy in general, as well as to Indonesian and Japanese 
economy. The new trade agenda will be transmitted to Indonesian and Japanese economy 
through trade channels. 
When Trump Trade Agenda is implemented to China and Mexico, there will be no 
significant impact to both Indonesian and Japanese economy in the short run. Indonesia and 
Japan will get trade creation and trade diversion effect from this agenda. For Indonesia and 
Japan, the market opportunities created from trade diversion and trade creation effects can 
generate a capital accumulation in the long run. These capital accumulation and increase of 
market opportunities would be the reasons of the long run effects to Japan and Indonesian 
economies.
If Trade Hit List Agenda is implemented by the US; Indonesia and Japan will get 
disadvantages, particularly in the long run. When Indonesia and Japan get trade restriction 
from the US, its export to US will decline. This will be transmitted to the Indonesian and Japan 
economy through trade channel, affecting private demand to go down. When private demand 
goes down, it will affect imports to decline and the industrial outputs will negatively be affected. 
5 All simulations in the policy options of both Indonesia and Japan are using the long-run closures, where RORDELTA=1 and capital 
stock (qo(“capital”,REG) is endogenous). In this context, cgdslack is remained exogenous.
6 A change in the risk premia is represented by implementing a shock on cgdslack (Malcolm, 1998), following the equation of rore(r)= 
rorg + cgdslack(r). This equation states that the percentage change in the rate of return on investment in region r is equal to the 
the percentage change in the global rate of return plus a risk premia.
7 The technical change on primary input of unskilled labour is implemented by imposing a shock on technical change variable in 
traded commodities in Indonesia, which is: afeall(“SkLab”,TRAD_COMM,”Indonesia”)
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In summary, any new trade restriction agenda will affect the global economy, particularly 
in the long run. The welfare loss will also happen in the short run and long run, but the loss 
will be higher in the long run. 
Looking at the long run effect of this new trade agenda, Indonesia and Japan should focus 
on the policy to mitigate the impact in the long run. It is suggested that Japan and Indonesia 
could focus on the following policies:
a. Japan: technological innovation can help Japan to increase its productivity and mitigate 
the global risks to its economy in the long run. Japan has to be able to implement its 
government plan on Industry 4.0 to ensure the innovation process in place. Furthermore, 
considering the ageing society in Japan, an increase in labour supply can be managed by 
encouraging women to participate into the labour force and increase the pension age. 
Encouraging family to have more children will also benefit to ensure the labour supply in 
the future, whilst at the same time the government should provide more facilities for child 
care and elderly-care; therefore women can have more hours for working.
b. Indonesia: the readiness of technological innovation in Indonesia is not as advanced as what 
Japan has planned. However, it does not mean that Indonesia cannot mitigate the global 
risks in the long term. Indonesia can focus on attracting more investment to induce capital 
accumulation in the long term, as the simulation results show that capital accumulation can 
support the long term growth and mitigate the global risks. Furthermore, increasing total 
factor productivity can be another focus of Indonesia, such as: intensifying infrastructure 
development, enhancing regulatory efficiencies in particular for businesses, as well as 
improving labour market efficiency. 
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